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Abstract—Covert channels aim to hide the existence of commu-
nication between two or more parties. Such channels typically
utilise pre-existing (overt) data transmissions to carry hidden
messages. Internet-based covert channels often encode new infor-
mation into unused (or loosely specified) IP packet header fields,
or the time intervals between IP packet arrivals. We propose a
novel covert channel embedded within the traffic of multiplayer,
first person shooter online games. We encode covert bits as slight,
yet continuous, variations of a player’s character’s movements.
Movement information is propagated to all clients attached to
a given game server, yet the channel remains covert so long as
the variations are visually imperceptible to the human players.
A modified version of Quake III Arena is used to demonstrate
our concept. We empirically analyse the covert channel’s bit rate,
and compare the statistical characteristics of unmodified game
traffic with those of game traffic carrying covert information.
Index Terms—Security, Covert Channels, Online Games
I. INTRODUCTION
Encryption alone is not sufficient to secure communication.
Often the simple fact that communication exists is enough to
raise suspicion and take further actions. Covert channels aim to
hide the very existence of the communication [1]. Individuals
and groups may have various reasons to utilise covert channels,
often motivated by the existence of an adversarial relationship
between two parties. Examples include government agencies
versus criminal or terrorist organisations, hackers or corporate
spies versus a company IT department, or dissenting citizens
versus their governments. Usually covert channels use means
of communication not normally intended to be used, making
the job of identifying them quite elusive.
Many network protocol-based covert channels have been
proposed, often exhibiting bit error and fading characteristics
not-unlike low-power radio channels. These channels range
from very simple (such as encoding covert information in
unused header bits) to very complex (such as encoding covert
information through temperature changes) [1]. Limited work
exists on covert channels in networked games, primarily
focused on board games [2], [3].
We propose a novel covert channel between players in mul-
tiplayer first person shooter (FPS) online games. Modern FPS
games typically offer two internal communication channels
– text chat and voice. However, text chat is usually logged
and filtered at the server and the same can be easily done
with any in-game voice communication. Our approach (which
we shall refer to as FPSCC) hides the covert communication
from server operators and unwitting players. Even players
whose clients are endpoints of the covert channel may remain
unaware of the covert information flow.
FPSCC hides covert information in minute, additional
movements of player characters in the virtual world. Character
movements intended by a human player are subject to slight
variations that encode covert bits. We choose variations that
will have no visible effect on the character’s movements as
perceived by other human players inside the game. A key
advantage of this approach is that character movement is
usually not logged at the server.
FPSCC has a number of desirable properties. FPS games
are very common and their network traffic is not suspicious
(although it may not be present in all circumstances). FPSCC
is a broadcast channel – information flows from one covert
sender to one or more covert receivers. FPSCC is an indirect
channel – covert sender and covert receiver use the game
server as an intermediary, rather than directly exchanging
IP packets. Detection of the covert sender does not directly
expose the identities of the covert receiver(s) (who could be
any of the players online at the same time).
Simple covert channels in network protocols may often be
easily eliminated, for example by protocol normalisation [1],
[4]. FPSCC is more challenging to eliminate, because it is tied
to player movement (an intrinsic function inside the games).
We discuss various ways the channel could be detected or
its capacity could be limited. Nevertheless, our work supports
the opinion expressed in various quarters that covert channels
are impossible to eliminate entirely, even in highly optimised
network protocols [5].
Our proof-of-concept FPSCC implementation is based on
the game Quake III Arena (Q3) [6]. We chose Q3 because it
uses the common client-server communication architecture and
the source code is freely available allowing us to understand
the network protocol without resorting to reverse engineering.
Implementation of FPSCC has enabled empirical analysis of
the covert channel scheme. We report on bit rate, and compare
statistical characteristics of unmodified game traffic with those
of game traffic carrying covert information.
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Like many covert channels FPSCC is a noisy, low bit
rate channel (we measured transmission rates of up to 7-9
bit/s). We see its main purpose in exchanging SMS-style text
messages. On the other hand we find FPSCC is difficult to
detect, as it looks very similar to ‘normal’ use of the protocol.
Despite our initial focus, our technique is not limited to FPS
games. FPSCC could be applied to any game where player
movements of one or more in-game characters are regularly
propagated to other players (and their game clients).
The paper is organised as follows. Section II reviews covert
channels, FPS games, and previously proposed covert channels
in games. Those parts of the Q3 game protocol relevant to
FPSCC are described in Section III. Section IV presents a
general technique for encoding covert information into player
movement, describes how it is specifically achieved in Q3,
discusses factors that introduce bit errors into the channel, and
describes available countermeasures. Section V overviews the
covert channel implementation. Section VI reports typical bit
rates of the covert channel and investigates the ‘fingerprint’ of
FPSCC based on a number of test games. The paper concludes
in Section VII with a discussion of future work.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Covert Channels Overview
This section reviews the concept of a covert channel (a
detailed treatment can be found in [1]). Covert channels
are often illustrated by the prisoner problem (Figure 1) in-
troduced by Simmons [7]. Prisoners Alice and Bob must
communicate to establish an escape plan, but Wendy (the
warden) monitors all their messages. Any signs of suspicious
messages will result in Wendy placing Alice and Bob into
solitary confinement, preventing an escape. Alice and Bob
must exchange innocuous messages (overt channel) containing
hidden information (covert channel) that Wendy will (ideally)
not notice.










Figure 1. Prisoner problem – communication model for covert channels
Assume Alice and Bob use two networked computers to
communicate. Their covert channel will be encoded in subtle
variations of the network traffic flowing between their com-
puters during normal, innocuous activity. Alice and Bob must
also share a secret – knowledge of how the covert channel is
encoded onto the overt channel, and any additional authenti-
cation/encryption applied to the covert channel messages.
In practice Alice and Bob may well be networked devices
controlled by the same person. For example, a corporate spy
might set up Alice and Bob on either sides of the company’s
network boundary to ex-filtrate restricted information. Wendy
represents the network manager who can monitor the passing
traffic for covert channels or alter the passing traffic to disrupt
or eliminate covert channels.
Alice and Bob are not required to be the sender and
receiver of the overt communication. One or both may be
compromised network devices along the overt traffic’s path
(known as middlemen). It is sufficient that Alice can observe
and manipulate overt traffic passing through, and Bob can
observe the overt+covert traffic passing through. (If Bob can
manipulate the traffic he may also chose to reverse the covert
channel encoding, thus restoring the original overt channel.)
Covert channels suffer from errors, due to interactions
between the covert encoding and the overt channel’s own in-
trinsic traffic patterns: substitutions (bits decoded incorrectly),
deletions (bits completely lost) and insertions (bits inserted).
B. First Person Shooter (FPS) Online Games
The publishing model for FPS games (such as Quake III
Arena, Unreal Tournament and Counter-Strike Source) makes
them intriguing for use as covert channels. FPS games are
based on the client server architecture, and publishers typically
release their server code free – relying on Internet Service
Providers (ISPs), dedicated game hosting companies and in-
dividual enthusiasts to host FPS servers. FPS game servers
typically host from less than 10 to around 30+ players and
(particularly for popular games such as Counter-Strike Source)
there may be tens of thousands of individually operated game
servers active on the Internet at any given time [8], [9]. Alice
and Bob thus have a wide variety of game servers through
which to establish legitimate-looking overt traffic flows.
C. Covert Channels in Games
Murdoch et al. [2] illustrated covert channels for collusion
in an online connect-4 contest (where one human contestant
could enter multiple programs as players). Murdoch et al.
won the contest by deploying two types of colluding players:
foxes and chickens. Foxes would play their best against other
competitors. Chickens would deliberately lose against foxes
and play their best against other competitors. Chickens used a
covert channel (based on the redundancy in the moves of the
game) to detect a fox.
Hernandez-Castro et al. [3] propose a framework for hiding
data in games based on game theory. They also describe how
covert information should be hidden in game strategies and ex-
plore possible countermeasures. They integrated the proposed
covert channel into a Go program and empirically analysed
the effectiveness of several detection strategies (steganalysis).
So far research focused on board games or their electronic
versions (such as Chess or Go) with two players taking
alternating turns. Both Murdoch et al. and Hernandez et
al. propose encoding covert information into the moves or
strategies played. Murdoch et al. also discusses how the timing
of moves could be used to encode covert information. While
these covert channels could be used for any purpose, collusion
is the main objective.
Covert channels developed for turn-based board games
cannot readily be applied to real-time FPS games. FPSCC
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aims to provide a general-purpose communications channel,
not merely co-ordinating collusion amongst players. Human
players provide the overt channel (movements, driven by
strategy and tactics). FPSCC provides a covert channel by
adding imperceptible fluctuations to player movement signals.
Players may be unaware of the covert channel’s existence, nor
aware of the traffic flowing over the covert channel.
III. QUAKE III ARENA PLAYER MOVEMENT PROTOCOL
Q3 uses a client-server architecture and relies on UDP/IP
packets to carry information between servers and clients.
FPSCC utilises the network traffic that occurs regularly during
game play, and ignores traffic associated with server-discovery
and initial client connection.
Figure 2 illustrates the message flow during game play.
User commands are sent from client to server once per
graphics frame rendered (but no more than once every 10 ms).
Snapshots are sent from server to client once every 50 ms (by







Figure 2. Messages exchanged





Figure 3. Player character move-
ment
Figure 3 illustrates the player movements that may be
indicated in each user command. Movement occurs along three
axes (left/right, forward/backward, up/down) and change of
view angle may be requested along two axes (yaw and pitch).
The player cannot modify roll. A user command also indicates
mouse button and keyboard button state (other than movement
related) as well as the selected weapon. To compensate for
packet loss, each UDP/IP packet sent by the client actually
contains the current and previous user commands. Client mes-
sages also contain ‘reliable’ commands, such as the disconnect
command.
Each client receives client-specific game world state updates
in snapshots. A snapshot contains the server’s authoritative be-
lief about the state of the client’s player (position, view angles
and player-specific events) as well as the state of all other
entities potentially visible to the client’s player (positions,
view angles and events). Entities can be other human player
characters, computer-controlled characters (bots) or objects.
Entity state updates are not sent for entities that the client’s
player cannot see; however, note that not all potentially visible
entities are actually visible on the player’s screen. This reduces
network traffic and mitigates a source of potential client-
side cheating (chapter 7, [9]). Server messages also contain
‘reliable’ commands (such as printing in-game messages on
the client screen).
Q3 uses sequence numbers in both directions to detect loss
of UDP/IP packets. If loss occurs, ‘reliable’ commands (that
affect the overall game state) are retransmitted. Lost user
commands and entity state updates are never retransmitted
as they are continuously updated anyway. User commands
sent by the client are timestamped, as are player and entity
state updates sent by the server. Consequently every update of
player state sent by the server can be unambiguously linked
to a corresponding (previous) user command sent by a client.
All user commands and state updates are delta encoded
to reduce packet size (so a data field is only sent if it has
changed) and all messages are compressed using adaptive
Huffman encoding [10]. Despite differences in specific details,
most FPS game protocols utilise a similar overall design.
Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between player position
information sent to the server, and the same information
received by other clients. Let us define xi to be client 1’s
player input for their character’s position along an axis (or the
view angle along one axis) in user command i and define yj
to be the position or view angle of client 1’s character sent
by the server to both clients in snapshot j. As user commands
usually arrive more frequently than snapshots are emitted, each
yj is computed based on the most recently received xi. Client 2
renders client 1’s player on screen based on yj until it receives





















Figure 4. Example user input values and server snapshot values
IV. FPS COVERT CHANNEL (FPSCC)
FPSCC creates a covert channel between two Q3 game
clients, where one client acts as Alice (sender) and the other
acts as Bob (receiver). FPSCC aims to avoid detection by
either the players controlling the game clients, or by an inde-
pendent observer (Wendy). Referring back to Figure 4, FPSCC
encodes covert information by modulating xi from client 1
(Alice) with visually imperceptible fluctuations in character
position or view angles. Client 2 (Bob) decodes the covert
information from yj updates arriving in successive snapshots.
FPSCC is not limited to unidirectional communication. Bob
could send covert information to Alice at the same time.
A. Encoding and Decoding
We leverage the fact that Q3 encodes more detail in xi
and yj than can normally be resolved (visually) by the human
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player. FPSCC modulates player view angle updates for pitch
and yaw, as player view angles are (with small exceptions
discussed later) almost entirely dictated by player input. (We
chose not to use position information as a character’s position
may be perturbed by various ‘forces’ acting on the player’s
character inside the game’s virtual world, making it very hard
to predict yj from xi.)
Because xi conveys relative view angles we use changes
in view angle to encode covert information. To minimise
detection, FPSCC only encodes covert information when the
player is adjusting their character’s view. If the player stops
moving their view, the covert channel pauses. (The covert
channel is effectively masked if FPSCC-induced changes are
small compared to the player’s own input). Our FPS game-play
experience suggests that such a covert channel is unlikely to
be noticed by average players in the heat of battle, and would
not affect their ability to play.
The details of FPSCC encoding are as follows. Let the
change in user input be Δi = xi − xi−1. Alice encodes
N bits of covert information with an integer value of b
(0 ≤ b ≤ 2N − 1) into each angle change so that
b = |ỹj − ỹj−1| mod 2
N , (1)
where ỹj and ỹj−1 are the angle values manipulated by
Alice. However, Alice can only indirectly modify yj by
modifying the user input xi.
As noted previously, the game server computes yj from
the most recently arrived xi. Q3’s asynchronous message
transmissions, unpredictable client message rate and variable
network delay make it impossible for Alice to predict which
xi will be used by the game server to compute yj . Therefore,
Alice has to encode the same covert bits in all xi sent between
the arrival of yj−1 and yj .
When Alice detects an angle change (Δi = 0), she starts
encoding the next covert bits to be send bn in the current
and all following user commands. Each time a snapshot is
received from the server, Alice checks whether the angle value
has changed (ỹj = ỹj−1). If not, Alice continues sending bn.
Otherwise Alice assumes bn has been successfully transmitted
and updates the previous angle value ỹj−1. The next user angle
change will cause Alice to start sending bits bn+1 and so on.
Covert bits are encoded by modifying user inputs as follows.
We define the user input modified by the covert sender to
x̃i = xi + δi. (2)
If Δi = 0 Alice encodes b by selecting δi such that
b = |x̃i − ỹj−1| mod 2
N . (3)
From equation 2 and equation 3 follows:
δi =
{
b− (xi − ỹj−1) mod 2
N xi − ỹj−1 ≥ 0
−b− (xi − ỹj−1) mod 2
N xi − ỹj−1 < 0
. (4)
However, Alice must avoid completely negating the angle
change. If (xi − ỹj−1) + δi = 0 she needs to modify δi:
δi =
{
N + δi xi − ỹj−1 ≥ 0
−N + δi xi − ỹj−1 < 0
. (5)
The next snapshot value ỹj will be based on one of the
x̃i arrived at the server between snapshot j − 1 and j, and
possible noise on the channel nj (see next sub section). Bob
decodes the covert bit(s) similar to equation 3:
b̂ = |ỹj − ỹj−1 + nj | mod 2
N . (6)
Figure 5 illustrates the encoding of covert bits in pitch, with
y0 = 0 and the same user input as in Figure 4. One bit of
covert information is encoded per pitch change, meaning an
even change signals a 0 bit and an odd change signals a 1 bit.
The angles modified by Alice are shown in bold. The boxes























































Figure 5. Example of covert channel encoding
B. Impact of Round Trip Time
Figure 5 assumes that the round trip time (RTT) between
client and server, plus the time between two client messages,
is smaller than the time between two server updates. If not,
Alice never knows the actual value of ỹj−1 and hence cannot
compute the correct δi. Given that server updates usually occur
every 50 ms, and client messages often every 10 ms, the covert
channel is limited to situations where RTT≤40 ms.
FPSCC can function over larger RTTs at the cost of reducing
the covert bit rate. If u is the time between game server updates
(50 ms), we now send bn in m server updates intervals, where
m ≥ 2 and m · u ≥RTT. The timestamps in server messages
can be used to control which updates contain covert bits.
C. Number of Encodable Bits
Our simplest case sends one bit per angle change (N = 1).
We might also select N based on the user input: the larger the
user’s change, the larger Alice’s modification can be without
being noticed. However, we also assume there will be an upper
bound δmax, which is the maximum modification Alice can
make before the channel security is compromised (e.g. the
channel affects game play or creates visible artefacts).
We define L to be the limit of how an angle can be modified:
max (δi (b, Ni))
max (δi (b, Ni)) + Δi
≤ L. (7)
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Then the number of encoded bits Ni is chosen to:
Ni ≤ min
(








Figure 6 illustrates the number of bits encodable N over
the user change Δi for different example values of δmax and
L. (For different δmax the lines have been slightly offset for
improved visibility.)
















δmax = 1, L = 0.15
δmax = 1, L = 0.3
δmax = 4, L = 0.15
δmax = 4, L = 0.3
δmax = 8, L = 0.15
δmax = 8, L = 0.3
Figure 6. Number of bits encodable vs user change for different δmax, L
FPSCC supports encoding covert bits in both pitch and yaw
simultaneously. Alice encodes the bits in the order the user
changes the angles between snapshots, for example if yaw
changes before pitch, bn will be encoded in yaw and bn+1 will
be encoded in pitch. Bob cannot know which angle changed
first and will always decode the bits in fixed order, the first bit
from pitch bn and the second bit from yaw bn+1. To prevent
FPSCC from swapping bits, Alice needs to swap both bits as
soon as she becomes aware that yaw has changed before pitch.
D. Broadcast Versus Unicast Covert Channel
As previously noted, Bob only receives snapshots containing
ỹj updates relating to Alice, if Alice’s in-game character
is potentially visible to Bob inside the game environment.
Consequently, there are two transmission modes open to Alice
– unicast and broadcast. If Alice knows the in-game identity
of Bob’s client then Alice can chose to only send covert data
when Bob’s character is known to be in range (determined
from the server snapshots). This is unicast mode, and the
covert channel may pause from time to time. However, if Alice
has no idea on which in-game client Bob resides, Alice simply
transmits covert data all the time. This is broadcast mode,
where the covert channel may experience significant periods
of lost bits.
Regardless of Alice’s transmission mode, Bob is not re-
quired to know in advance on which game client Alice resides.
Bob can simply attempt to decode covert information from
ỹj updates relating to every player. Any stream of ỹj updates
that generates meaningful covert information can be presumed
to come from Alice. (‘Meaningful’ could mean the existence
of pre-defined bit sequences as used in [2] or data structures
previously agreed upon by Alice and Bob.) However, if Alice’s
client’s identity (e.g. player name) is known, Bob can focus
on decoding ỹj updates relating to that specific player.
FPSCC allows multiple instances of Bob, each associated
with a different game client. Each Bob decodes part (or all)
of the covert channel’s data stream as their associated players
cross paths with Alice inside the game’s virtual world.
E. Noise
In broadcast mode there are deletions (bits lost when Bob
is out of range of Alice), but no insertions (as Bob does not
decode bits when Alice is not visible). In unicast mode both
deletions (if in a snapshot Bob is visible to Alice, but Alice is
not visible to Bob) and insertions (if Alice is visible to Bob,
but Bob is not visible to Alice) can occur (potential visibility
is asymmetric in Q3).
In Q3 view angles of player characters mostly depend on
user input only. However, there can be ‘unexpected’ view angle
changes, such as players respawning after having died, players
teleporting or players standing on moving objects. Alice takes
these server-side changes into account as soon as she becomes
aware of them from the player state updates. However, some
bit errors may occur, with frequency dependent on the game
play and the server settings (for example, moving objects or
teleporters are not present in all Q3 maps).
The Q3 server clamps pitch to angles between approxi-
mately -90 and 90 degrees. Since the server indicates in each
snapshot if an angle has been clamped, Alice and Bob only
need stop encoding and decoding until the angle is no longer
clamped to avoid bit errors.
So far we assumed the server sends a snapshot j out to
Alice and Bob at the same time. However, if Alice or Bob
have slow Internet connections the server will throttle the rate
of snapshots during times of high activity. Then a snapshot
j may be skipped for either Alice or Bob, but not the other,
causing bit deletions, insertions or substitutions. We assume
that these days most players have broadband connections (e.g.
at least 128 kbps DSL or Cable) and the server will not throttle
snapshots even during times of high activity.
Another source of noise is the loss of UDP/IP packets in
the network. User commands are highly redundant and only
the loss of all of Alice’s commands between two snapshots
affects the channel. In the worst case such a burst loss can
cause substitutions, but not deletions or insertions. On the
other hand loss of snapshots can cause deletions, insertions
or substitutions if a snapshot j is lost for either Alice or Bob
but not the other.
F. Countermeasures
In general there are three classes of countermeasures: elimi-
nating the covert channel, limiting the covert channel capacity
and deterring potential users by demonstrating easy detection
of the covert channel [1].
FPSCC cannot be eliminated because player movement is
intrinsic to the game. Additional noise could be introduced to
limit the covert channel capacity (such as the game server
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introducing minute, random fluctuations in every player’s
view angles – although such noise must also have no visible
consequences for players). Alice could counter by increase
the amplitude of the covert encoding, but if the view angle
fluctuations become visible the channel is no longer covert.
FPSCC may be detected in a number of ways. A human
Wendy could join a game or replay a recorded game and
look for abnormal player movements. Wendy can also analyse
packet length and view angle statistics and compare them to
‘normal’ distributions in order to detect the channel. However,
even if Wendy detects the channel and identifies Alice, Bob
is still partly protected. If Alice is in broadcast mode, Wendy
cannot know the client(s) acting as Bob(s). In unicast mode,
Alice can interfere with Wendy identifying Bob by sending
‘garbage’ (when Bob is not in range) with similar character-
istics to FPSCC.
Slight angle movements of another player character are
basically invisible to human players. The game server already
introduces angle errors of up to one degree by only distributing
the integer value of the angle to other players (see Section
V). If Alice is a middleman, there is a greater chance that
the player whose character’s movements are being modulated
might notice abnormalities, as the server transmits view angles
to the player as full floating point numbers. However, Alice
could ‘clean’ the view angles being sent back to the client
from the server.
FPSCC has no need to introduce noticeable additional
latency between client and server. Our un-optimised, passive
middleman implementation introduced roughly 1 ms addi-
tional latency. Given that in-game client-side reporting of
‘ping’ often fluctuates by ±10 ms, FPSCC is unlikely to be
discovered by players paying close attention to their ‘ping’.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
Our prototype of FPSCC is implemented using our Covert
Channels Evaluation Framework (CCHEF) [11]. CCHEF is
a publicly available software framework under Linux for
developing and deploying covert channels over IP networks.
A. Quake III Arena through CCHEF
Figure 7 shows CCHEF transmitting covert information over
a network from Alice to Bob. CCHEF allowed Alice and Bob
to be implemented as middlemen (instantiated as transparent
proxies between Q3 client and server). Current cheat detection
systems cannot detect proxy middlemen (see next sub section)
and the proxy does not use extra CPU time on either game
clients or game server. Finally, during development CCHEF
allowed us to test the covert receiver using previously recorded
tcpdump trace files as input.
The Q3 network protocol is encrypted. Our implementation
of Alice accesses traffic in both directions to derive and
update the Q3 encryption keys, decrypt user command packets,
perform the covert channel modulation, and re-encrypt the
modified user command packets. Bob passively decrypts the
packet stream in both directions and decodes the covert
channel from the view angle changes of entity state updates.
Our implementation properly handles the various encodings
of view angles in different Q3 messages. In user commands
angles are encoded as signed 16-bit integer ( α
360 · 65535),
angles in player state are encoded as floating-point numbers
and angles in entity state (send to other players) are encoded
as the integer part of the floating-point number. The integer
floating point conversion introduces rounding errors and Alice











Figure 7. CCHEF instantiating Alice and Bob across a network path
B. Deployment Considerations for Alice and Bob
Cheat protection built into recent multiplayer FPS games
makes deployment of covert channels challenging. Client
software and data files are checked for integrity and the
memory of the client machine is searched for signatures of
known cheats. Games typically encrypt their network protocol
to protect against proxy-based cheats.
It is relatively straightforward for a player to knowingly act
as Bob. FPS clients usually allow recording of demo files,
which contain (un-encrypted) all the entity state updates seen
during the recorded game sequence. Bob (as player) simply
records a ‘demo’ and decodes the covert data after the game.
Alice needs to modify the game protocol during the game.
We have implemented FPSCC using a proxy-based approach,
because Q3 is open source and hence the encryption algorithm
is known. Proxies cannot be detected by current anti-cheat
software integrated in games. However, even if the encryption
algorithm is not publicly known it may be possible to crack
it as described in [12].
Alice can be deployed on the client as client-side modifi-
cation (mod). However, many public servers do not accept
modified clients. Alice can still be deployed on the client
like other client-side cheating tools. These tools work without
requiring a modification of the game client and can only be
detected if the anti-cheat software knows their signature. Even
if Alice’s signature became known, it could be easily modified
to evade the signature detection. Currently, no method exists
for reliably preventing unknown client-side cheats.
VI. EVALUATION
We carried out a total of 9 games on the standard Q3
map q3dm1. Each game lasted about 10 minutes. Table I
summarises the games. If the covert channel was present,
Alice sent in broadcast mode and one bit of covert data was
encoded per view angle change, encoding in pitch and yaw
simultaneously. The covert data sent was random with an equal
probability of 0 and 1 bits (uniform random) to avoid bias.
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Players other than the covert sender did not know which
games had covert channels. Games were played in ‘random’
order (not as listed in Table I) and players were asked not to
drastically change their playing style between games.
Table I
TEST GAMES SUMMARY
Number of players Games with FPSCC Games w/o FPSCC
2 1, 2 3
3 4, 5 6
4 7, 8 9
A. Bit Rate and Errors
Table II shows the bit rates and error percentages of the
covert channel. Each row is an average of two games. Column
one lists the game numbers and column two denotes the
client number (possible Bobs). The third column shows Alice’s
covert transmission rate. Column four shows percentage of bit
deletions, column five percentage of bit insertions, and column
six percentage of bit substitutions. Column three, four and five
show percentages for broadcast (b) and unicast (u) mode (the
latter derived after the fact from visibility data).
Table II
SENDER BIT RATES AND CHANNEL ERRORS








1, 2 1 14.6 / 8.0 45.9 / 3.6 0.0 / 2.5 0.0
4, 5 1 18.0 / 10.4 42.9 / 3.0 0.0 / 1.5 0.0
4, 5 2 18.0 / 9.8 46.7 / 3.5 0.0 / 1.5 0.0
7, 8 1 17.8 / 8.2 54.9 / 5.5 0.0 / 2.7 0.0
7, 8 2 17.8 / 9.6 45.8 / 3.1 0.0 / 1.0 0.0
7, 8 3 17.8 / 9.9 45.2 / 3.6 0.0 / 1.5 0.0
Alice was able to send 14-18 bit/s in broadcast mode. As
expected, the percentage of deletions is high (43-55%) and the
number of insertions is zero. In unicast mode Alice sent 8-10
bit/s and the channel has deletions (3-5.5%) and insertions (1-
2.7%). At best our FPSCC implementation encoding only one
bit per angle change could achieve transmission rates up to
7-9 bit/s (assuming good bit synchronisation).
It is important to note that deletions and insertions caused
by FPSCC are not uniformly distributed, but occur in bursts.
This means often there are longer ‘transmission periods’
followed by longer ‘outages’. Therefore, the channel is usable
even with the very high deletion rates in broadcast mode.
Figure 8 shows typical cumulative distributions (CDFs) of the
length of transmission periods (number of bits between any
deletions/insertions) with client 1 as Bob (games 1, 4 and 8).
Even for the ‘worst’ game still 40% of transmission periods
were at least 50 bits or longer.
Differences in the percentages of deletions/insertions be-
tween different receivers are fairly small. No bit substitu-
tions occurred since our FPSCC implementation handles pitch
clamping (and also players pitch varied only between −20
and 60 degrees) and player deaths/respawns, the map has no
teleporters/movers and there was no packet loss in our testbed.






















Figure 8. Length of transmission periods for broadcast and unicast mode
This means that if the bit synchronisation problem caused by
Q3’s asymmetric visibility can be solved, the remaining bit
error rate should be fairly low.
B. Fingerprint of FPSCC
The human players did not notice anything strange in the
movements of the character being used by Alice. The player
being used by Alice likewise did not usually notice any
visual abnormalities. However, in our case Alice’s player was
constantly jumping and moving around. If Alice’s player spent
a lot of time performing tasks requiring delicate movements
(such as sniping at a distant target) discovery of the covert
channel is increasingly likely.
Wendy would not have much luck detecting FPSCC by
examining packet length distributions. Q3 is known to exhibit
wide variation in packet sizes versus the number of players
and the map played [13]. Figure 9 compares packet length
CDFs for normal traffic and the covert channel (two 2-player
games, one 3-player game). It is clear that the existence of the
covert channel results in packet size distributions essentially
indistinguishable from what is considered ‘normal’.
Wendy could instead examine the distribution of angle
changes. If Wendy controls the server, a modified server could
be installed to log all player movements for later analysis.
Alternatively, Wendy could join as a regular player and log all
received player movement updates (although covert data would
only be received when Wendy is visible to Alice’s player). In
any case, Figure 10 shows that Wendy would see very little
difference between the CDFs of angle values for a normal
player and a player acting as covert sender (two games for
player 1 and one game for players 2, 3 and 4).
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We propose and prototype a novel covert channel in first
person shooter online game traffic (FPSCC). FPSCC encodes
covert bits as imperceptible variations of a player’s character’s
movements. FPSCC is not limited to FPS games, but could be
applied to any game where player movements of one or more
in-game characters are regularly propagated to other players
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Figure 9. Packet length distributions (including IP/UDP headers) for client to server (left) and server to client (right) traffic






































Figure 10. Angle distributions for pitch (left) and yaw (right)
(and their game clients). We analyse FPSCC using a proof-of-
concept implementation based on Quake III Arena (Q3). Our
tests reveal that FPSCC over Q3 provides bit rates of up to 7-9
bits per second. This low bit rate is sufficient for propagating
short text messages. The main advantage of FPSCC over other
network channels is that it cannot be fully eliminated and
detection is non-trivial.
A number of items remain as future work. We intend to
explore mechanisms for reliably transporting messages on top
of FPSCC, leveraging existing techniques for framing, loss
detection, forward error correction, etc, over noisy wireless
channels. We also plan to explore mechanisms for effectively
detecting FPSCC. In principle FPSCC allows transmission of
multiple covert bits per angle change, but this is not yet im-
plemented in our prototype. While our current results are very
encouraging, more trials (with more human players, different
maps and game server settings) are planned to enhance our
understanding of FPSCC’s limitations and performance.
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